Dual-process theory accurately describes interplay of intuition and analytic thinking
“Dual-process theory formalised the distinction between Type 1 (fast, intuitive) and Type 2 (slow, analytic) processes. Evans (2008) argued many tasks contain competing answers, with performance depending on whether analytic processing overrides intuition. Kahneman (2011) proposed a “cognitive economy” where Type 2 is engaged only when necessary. Evans & Stanovich (2013) distinguish defining features (working memory, cognitive decoupling) from correlates (speed, consciousness), emphasising intuition is not inherently flawed.”
Summary
Dual‑process theory indeed formalises Type 1 as fast, intuitive and Type 2 as slow, analytic. Evans (2008) notes many tasks present competing answers, with performance hinging on whether analytic processing overrides intuition. Kahneman (2011) describes a “cognitive economy” where Type 2 is recruited only when needed. Evans & Stanovich (2013) separate defining features such as working‑memory load and cognitive decoupling from correlates like speed and consciousness, and they stress that intuition is not inherently flawed.
Sources 59 searched
- Dual Process Theory - an overview | ScienceDirect Topics
I will follow the convention proposed ... In addition to these defining features, Evans (2008) and Evans and Stanovich (2013) describe a set of attributes that are associated with each process by some versions of dual-process theory....
- Dual-process theories of reasoning: Contemporary issues and developmental applications - ScienceDirect
Following the coining of the terms by Stanovich (1999), it has become common practice to refer to the types of processing in terms of System 1 and 2 (e.g. Evans, 2008, Kahneman and Frederick, 2002).
- What makes us think? A three-stage dual-process model of analytic engagement - ScienceDirect
Using a version of a classic decision making task, we provide evidence for two core claims derived from the model: (1) The detection of conflicts between intuitive responses is a key determinant of analytic engagement, but sometimes fails, and (2) ...
- Dual Process Theory: Embodied and Predictive; Symbolic and Classical - PMC
This theory, proposing there are ... sharp distinction between two clusters of correlational features. One cluster describes a fast and intuitive process, while the other describes a slow and reflective one (Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2011; Evans and Stanovich, 2013)....
- Dual Processes in Decision Making and Developmental Neuroscience: A Fuzzy-Trace Model - PMC
In particular, we show how the most popular and extensively studied model of decision making—prospect theory—can be derived from fuzzy-trace theory by combining analytical (verbatim) and intuitive (gist) processes. Based on evidence from a wide variety of tasks (e.g., Reyna, 1995, 1996; Reyna & Adam, 2003; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995), we have identified five components of processing in reasoning and decision making: (a) stored knowledge and values; (b) mental representations of problems or situations; (c) retrieval of knowledge and values; (d) implementation of knowledge and values; and (e) developmental and individual differences in monitoring and inhibiting interference (e.g., from emotional arousal, wrong representations, or overlapping classes) (for overviews, see Reyna, 2004, 2008).
- Adaptive Decision‐Making “Fast” and “Slow”: A Model of Creative Thinking - PMC
He demonstrated that these systems complement each other, arguing that Kahneman's (2011) model oversimplifies cognitive processes. Researchers have critically examined the fast–slow division, stressed the complexity of cognitive processes, and advocated for acknowledging quantitative differences (Evans 2008; Evans and Stanovich 2013).
- What makes us think? A three-stage dual-process model of analytic engagement - PubMed
According to the model, multiple Type 1 processes may be cued by a stimulus (Stage 1), leading to the potential for conflict detection (Stage 2). If successful, conflict detection leads to Type 2 processing (Stage 3), which may take the form ...
- A Case Study: Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition-Commentary on Evans & Stanovich (2013) - PubMed
Historically, DPTs have attempted to provide a conceptual framework that helps classify and predict differences in patterns of behavior found under some circumstances and not others in a host of reasoning, judgment, and decision-making tasks. As evidence has changed and techniques for examining behavior have moved on, so too have DPTs. Killing two birds with one stone, Evans and Stanovich (2013, this issue) respond to five main criticisms of DPTs.
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